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Washington should avoid repeating 
Plan Colombia’s failures 
Investing more in ineffective militarized policies will undermine, not 
strengthen, peace and justice 
 
February 9, 2016 2:00AM ET 
by Lauren Carasik   @LCarasik 
 
On Feb. 4, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and President Barack 
Obama celebrated the 15th anniversary of Plan Colombia, a controversial U.S. 
aid program to Bogotá signed in 2000 to fight the so-called war on drugs and 
enhance internal security. 
The Colombian government is expected to sign a long-awaited peace agreement 
with Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas in March, 
ending the country’s 50-year conflict, in which more than 220,000 people — 
mostly civilians — were killed. Washington has provided nearly $10 billion in aid 
to Colombia since 2000, 71 percent of which has been allocated to security 
forces. U.S. officials say the initiative was instrumental in moving the peace 
process forward. 
But glowing reviews of Plan Colombia obscure its ineffectiveness and the 
devastating human costs of the country’s militarization. The crackdown has led to 
massive upheaval, with more than 4 million people internally displaced since 
2000. Of those, most were women and children, with Afro-Colombian and 
indigenous people disproportionately affected. The staggering number — about a 
tenth of the country’s nearly 50 million people — adds to those previously 
dispossessed, leaving Colombia second only to Syria in terms of internally 
displaced people. The National Unit for the Integral Attention and Reparation of 
Victims has registered more than 6 million people seeking restitution for harms 
inflicted during Plan Colombia’s operation. 
The crackdown was also accompanied by egregious human rights abuses. Since 
the plan’s inception, more than 1,000 trade unionists and at least 370 
journalists have been killed; at least 400 human rights defenders were murdered, 
with many more activists tortured, disappeared, kidnapped or detained; and 
nearly half a million women were subjected to sexual violence from 2001 to 2009. 
To burnish claims of the plan’s success, security forces killed more than 5,700 
civilians from 2000 to 2010, many lured to their deaths by the promise of jobs. 
Military members later staged combat scenes to make it appear as if the deaths 
were caused by warfare. Impunity has been widespread. Out of some 3,500 
killings investigated by Colombia’s prosecutor general, only 402 resulted in 
convictions, mostly of low-level forces. Last year, Prosecutor General Eduardo 
Montealegre announced that 22 generals are being investigated, but their long 
overdue prosecution is far from certain. In fact, some top officers associated with 
the scandal have been nominated for promotions. 
Human rights groups have criticized the demobilization of right-wing paramilitary 
groups operating under the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia coalition, 
which was closely allied with Colombia’s armed forces. The paramilitaries were 
among the worst violators in the conflict, responsible for most of the killings, and 
were the primary beneficiaries of a massive land transfer that led to forced 
displacement of locals. 
The group’s members were offered reduced sentences in exchange for telling the 
truth and reparations, but most have yet to face justice, since the process has 
moved at a glacial pace. And some formed criminal gangs dubbed bacrims, 
which continue to operate with the cooperation of U.S.-backed Colombian 
security forces. 
Parts of Colombia, particularly the southern Pacific coastal area, have 
experienced a troubling recent spike in paramilitary activities. The 
bacrims remain active in the increasingly violent port city of Buenaventura. The 
economy is more stable, yet poverty and inequality have been exceptionally 
stubborn in rural areas. But Plan Colombia mostly benefited the country’s elites. 
Washington must critically assess the harmful effects of Plan 
Colombia and adopt a nonmilitarized approach, designed with 
the broad participation of civil society, to help rebuild the 
country. 
Aside from the catastrophic humanitarian toll, crediting Plan Colombia with 
paving the way for peace by weakening FARC and forcing the insurgents to the 
bargaining table is misleading. In fact, the militarization prolonged the bloodshed 
by helping derail peace talks from 1999 to 2002 between then-President Andrés 
Pastrana and FARC. U.S. investment in the military buildup helped embolden his 
government to reject a negotiated settlement in favor of a battlefield victory. 
Santos is now seeking an increase in U.S. aid for post-conflict reconstruction. As 
Washington commits to additional funding, it should take stock of the plan’s 
abysmal failures, which have contributed to incalculable misery. For one, Plan 
Colombia’s raison d’ être — fighting drug trafficking — has failed. Bogotá is still 
the world’s top producer and exporter of cocaine.Cultivation has been 
rising since 2012 and is nearing the level in 2000. 
Second, the effect of Colombia’s militarization extends far beyond its borders. 
Thanks to its well-funded military forces — trained by the U.S. in 
counternarcotics and counterinsurgency — Colombia has evolved into a security 
exporter, providing training to foreign military forcesthroughout the rest of South 
America, the Caribbean and West Africa. U.S.-funded international training 
programs are seen as a way of capitalizing on the skills acquired under Plan 
Colombia and providing secure employment for demobilized Colombian troops. 
Key details of U.S. assistance and logistical support for the training programs 
remain shrouded in secrecy. For example, it is unclear who is conducting the 
training, which forces are being trained and whether they are being properly 
vetted for compliance with human rights norms. Without transparency, the 
programs cannot be subject to proper monitoring and assessment. It is ironic that 
Santos is now exporting the militarized and prohibitionist aspects of the war on 
drugs, the logic and effectiveness of which he has openly questioned. 
Ravaged by decades of conflict, Colombia faces the monumental task of 
rebuilding its institutions and dismantling the conditions that gave rise to the 
conflict, including dramatically unequal land distribution. But the threat of 
continued violence will not evaporate with the peace deal, prompting some 
observers to call for ongoing vigilance and the importance of treating the next 
phase as post-accord rather than post-conflict. 
Last month FARC and Santos’ government asked the United Nations to provide 
an unarmed peacekeeping mission to verify a bilateral cease-fire and 
disarmament. The focus will now turn to winning the support of war-weary 
Colombians, who must approve the deal through a referendum, and securing 
funding necessary to implement the plan. 
Costs of post-conflict reconstruction are estimated to be more than $90 billion 
over the next 10 years to cover development aid, especially for rural areas, and 
to assist in demobilizing and reintegrating FARC fighters. Obama announced that 
he will seek more than $450 million — a 25 percent increase from the year 
before — from Congress under a new plan called Peace Colombia. 
Colombia needs international support to achieve a lasting peace. But before 
committing to additional aid, Washington must critically assess the harmful 
effects of Plan Colombia and adopt a nonmilitarized approach, designed with the 
broad participation of civil society, to help rebuild the country. 
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